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Abstract
This paper explores the role of elite networks in shaping business strategies inthe cleantech industry. In order to do so, we investigate whether and if so howboards of directors cater to the resource needs of the innovative and expandingcleantech industry. We create a new dataset of the board network of leadingcleantech firms that allows us to show how cleantech directors are integratedinto the worlds of government, banking, and research. The strategic merits ofboard networks considered are 1) the need for operational resources 2) the needfor conducive policies; and 3) the need for market access. We find that Financeand Innovation are most sought after, and domestic networks remain dominant.While larger firms are well embedded in big business and finance, smallercorporations seek ties with innovation and policy networks. Cleantech firmscurrently show no significant capacity to reduce dependencies in terms ofaccess to future cleantech markets. The findings suggest that the ‘classic’resource needs, such as finance, are much better ‘covered’ through the board’snetwork structures than those resources that would enable a firm to improve itslong­standing needs, such as a favourable policy environment and access tofuture markets.
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Resumen
Este artículo explora el rol de las redes directivas en la conformación de estrategiasempresariales en la industria de las tecnologías limpias. Con este fin, investigamosen qué medida las juntas directivas responden a la necesidad de recursos de lainnovadora industria de las tecnologías limpias en expansión. Creamos una nuevabase de datos de las redes de juntas directivas de las empresas de tecnología limpia,lo que nos permite mostrar cómo éstas juntas están integradas en las redes degobiernos, bancos y grupos de investigación. Los méritos estratégicos de las redesde juntas directivas son 1) la necesidad de recursos operativos, 2) la necesidad depolíticas adecuadas, y 3) la necesidad de acceso al mercado. Encontramos que lafinanciación y la innovación son lo más buscado, y que las redes localespermanecen dominantes. Mientras que las compañías más grandes estánconvenientemente insertas en las grandes finanzas y negocios, las compañíaspequeñas buscan lazos con las redes de innovación y de diseño de políticas. En laactualidad, las empresas de tecnologías limpias no muestran significativamentecapacidad de reducir dependencias en términos de acceso a los futuros mercados detecnologías limpias. Los resultados sugieren que las necesidades "clásicas" derecursos, como las finanzas, se hallan mejor "cubiertas" con las estructuras de redesde juntas directivas que aquellos recursos que permitían a una compañía mejorarsus necesidades habituales, como las políticas ambientales favorables y el acceso afuturos mercados.
Palabras clave: tecnologías limpias, análisis de redes sociales, teoría de ladependencia, junta directiva, élite corporativa
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he rise of the clean technology industry (Cleantech) is difficultto ignore. Global investment in renewable energy technologiesfor example increased five­fold between 2004 and 2010(DIREC, 2010, p.20). Official figures from Bloomberg New EnergyFinance cite a total of US$ 35 billion in 2004, up to US$ 186.6 billion in2009 and US$ 243 billion in 2010. In 2009, revenue from the solar,wind and biofuel sectors alone grew by 11.4 per cent, reaching a total ofUS$ 139 billion. Almost all renewable energy industries experiencedmanufacturing growth in 2009, despite the continuing global economiccrisis. A look at the level of investments in non­renewable energyconfirms this trend. 2008 was the first year that investment in renewabletechnologies was more than the investment in fossil­fuelledtechnologies (UNEP & New Energy Finance, 2009, p.11). Beyondd thistrend in renewables, Cleantech as a whole is expected to growsignificantly in the coming decade. As a recent report from the RolandBerger Consultancy projects: “[t]he market for clean technology […] isbooming, and was in 2007 larger than the pharmaceutical industry. Itwill be the 3rd industrial sector in the world in 2020 (EUR 1600billion)” (Roland Berger, 2009, p. 2). As is the case with many up­and­coming industries, cleantech ismarked by rapid expansion. Growth rates are impressive and individualbusinesses are continuously looking for new opportunities. In such afast­paced business environment, reducing key dependencies is apriority for businesses looking to stay in the game. Any given companyneeds to safeguard its access to those resources it needs in order tocreate, sell and distribute its products or services. And many times thoseresources are acquired through another company. Resource dependencytheory (RDT) investigates the possibilities for corporate players tominimize existing dependencies in order to sustain its business. TheRDT literature includes five key strategies for companies to do so: 1)mergers; 2) joint ventures; 3) political action; and 4) executivesuccession; and 5) boards of directors; (Hillman, Withers, & Collins,2009, p. 1405­1414). The studies that focus on boards of directors show
Resource Base and Strategic Board Networks in
the Cleantech Industry
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how boards play a role in the corporate affairs beyond theirmanagement, monitoring and control task (Hillman, Withers, & Collins,2009, p. 1408). Pfeffer and Salancik’s seminal work on corporate boardsis authoritative in this regard. They argue that boards are composed in away that matches the skills and networks provided by the boardmembers on the one hand with the resources needed by the firm on theother (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As a consequence, "board size andcomposition are not random or independent factors, but are, rather,rational organizational responses to the conditions of the externalenvironment" (Pfeffer, 1972, p. 226). For cleantech companies, theseinter­personal linkages between its board members and business leaders,political decision­makers or other relevant broker figures can make thedifference between boom and gloom. This perspective is gainingmomentum with the "increased recognition that the leveraging of inter­organizational [networks] is a strategic resource that can be shaped bymanagerial action" (Huggins, Johnston, & Thompson, 2012, p.207). Yet, despite a burgeoning literature on inter­organizational networks(e.g. Bergenholtz & Waldstrøm, 2011), little attention is given to howthe ubiquitous networks of boards of directors cater to the resourceneeds of innovative and expanding industries such as the cleantechindustry. The aim of this article is to take a first step in closing this gap.To what extent do boards cater for the resource needs required for asuccessful cleantech company? In order to answer this question, webuild a new empirical dataset of the board network of a set of leadingcleantech firms, covering the cleantech directors’ additional boardmemberships elsewhere. This allows us to explore and improve ourunderstanding of a structural feature underpinning the elite network ofthe fast­growing cleantech business. So why is it important to look at the issue of resource dependency?For corporate directors it is common practice to sit on a number of otherboards (Kogut, 2012; Stokman, Ziegler, & Scott, 1985). When a directorsits on at least two boards, an interlocking directorate is created. In thisway boards link the organization with its external environment byestablishing important contacts and providing access to timelyinformation through these personal networks (Van Ees, Gabrielsson, &Huse, 2009, p. 310). And there are strong connections made in theliterature between interlocks and resource dependency (Mizruchi, 1996,
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p. 274). Corporations that are interlocked with strategically related firmshave been found to receive better advice, counsel and other business­related information, all of which are positively related to theperformance of the firm (Westphal, 1999). Board interlocks may occur for a number of reasons, stemming fromboth a firm’s strategy and any given director’s personal career path(Mizruchi, 1996). But once a network of interlocking directorates is inplace, it is consequential. Huggins et al (2012) make a useful distinctionin this respect between social capital and network capital. Networkcapital refers to the more calculative ties held by organizations asdistinct from social capital’s focus on the social interrelations ofindividual board members. Board networks as social capital areempirically established pipelines for the diffusion of corporategovernance practices and innovation (Davis, 1991; Geletkanycz &Hambrick, 1997; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Haunschild, 1993; Rao &Sivakumar, 1999; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Here however we areinterested in network capital: strategic networks that accrue advantagesfor firms (Huggins, Johnston, & Thompson, 2012, p.207). We expectthat the cleantech firms are particularly keen on engaging in board tieswith organisations that can help to increase access to crucial resources.In the next section we discuss this resource base in more detail. We thenanalyse how interlocking directorates create the cleantech industry’snetwork, and to what extent the network’s structure confirms what wewould expect from a network capital perspective. This means we willfocus on the potential access to, and not the actual use of strategicresources. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next sectionfirst elaborates on the key resource dependencies that cleantech firmsmay have. From this, a number of expectations will be derived. Next,we introduce the research methods and describe the dataset we createdfor the purpose of this paper. We use network analysis tools toinvestigate the set of the world’s leading 77 cleantech companies.Interpreting this dataset represents a first attempt to create a morecomprehensive understanding of how well cleantech elite networks arepositioned to deal with resource dependencies. Section 4 shows themain results; section 5 discusses the findings and suggests futureorientation for resource dependency theory research. Our contribution to
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literature is twofold. We add empirical knowledge about the boardnetworks that are responsible for the management decisions driving thelargest companies in the emerging cleantech sector. The dataset wecreate is original both in scope (cleantech industry) as in its aim(mapping resource bases). Second we evaluate the relevance of threetheoretical perspectives to the strategic use of board networks andadvance the theoretical debate about RDT by using social networkanalysis and economic geography tools. By exploring the boomingcleantech industry in this way, we contribute to an improvedunderstanding of emerging business sectors and how they deal withresource dependencies.
The corporate board network of cleantech firms can cater to its needs inthree distinct ways. The literature suggests that the board network canbe used to reduce 1/ the need for operational resources (in particularfinance and innovation); 2/ the need for conducive policies; and 3/ theneed for market access. First, cleantech needs operational resources.According to classic RDT, board interlocks are used to securepreferential access to these (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For the cleantechindustry, the two main operational resources are finance and innovation.Finance is key, as many of the industry’s advances are capital­intensiveand potential returns on investments can take a long time – a long timewithout profits to cover payback for loans. Often being newcomercompanies, these corporate outfits are generally not well­positioned tosecure standard loans from commercial banks. “Loan financing is moredifficult for early stage companies to attract, as traditional commercialbanks are typically unwilling to lend to companies who have not yetgenerated revenues and do not yet have substantial assets to pledge ascollateral” (Epstein, Berg, & Morello, 2010, p. 1). Good, reliable accessto capital is therefore a major challenge for cleantech companies. Inaddition, cleantech is technology­driven, and requires a constant flow ofinnovation in order to survive in a competitive market. In fact, much ofthe innovation relevant to cleantech is driven by academic institutions(Ragnitz, Schmalholz, Triebswetter, & Wackerbauer, 2009, p. 7). This
Resource Dependency and Board Interlocks
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calls for a well­established network that can generate (access to)research knowledge in the field of cleantech. Henriques and Sadorskypoint out that the renewable energy sector provides a clear example ofthe cleantech sector's link to innovation. The renewables industry sharesmore characteristics with the innovation­driven technology sector thanthe energy sector (Henriques & Sadorsky, 2008). The reasons for thisare twofold: On the one hand renewable energy still has to prove that itoffers a valid alternative to current, well­consolidated energytechnologies, such as oil and gas. On the other hand, clean energy canonly become a lasting success story if costs continue to decrease (Arent,Wise, & Gelman, 2011). The latter, industry experts agree, is contingenton innovation. Second, as a device for elite formation (Domhoff, 1967; Scott, 1997)board interlocks constitute a policy­network through which cleantechfirms can engage in lobbying efforts for conducive policies (Carroll &Carson, 2003; Culpepper, 2009). Here board interlocks do not operatethrough direct intervention but through their ability to set the parametersof the corporate environment within which all cleantech firms have tooperate (Scott, 1997, p.188). After all, cleantech is dependent on aconducive regulatory environment. The (national) policies in place thatsupport, or hinder, the industry’s economic vitality are critical successfactors for individual companies. This is the case for both sides of thepush­pull spectrum: technology push policies (i.e. research grants) andmarket pull policies (i.e. procurement guidelines, tax credits forconsumers of cleantech products) (Dowlatabadi, 1998; Grubb,Haduong, & Chapuis, 1995). Most agree that corporate decision­makinghighly depends on whether existing policies are ‘loud, long and legal’ inorder to minimise investment risks (UNEP SEFI & New EnergyFinance, 2007). In fact, countries that have offered the greatestconsistency in supportive policy ­ particularly in renewable energies ­have scored highest both in terms of stimulating corporate growth andeconomic efficiency (Buerer & Wuestenhagen, 2009, p. 4999).Mendonca et al point out that, based on renewable energy experiences inDenmark and the United States, “[l]ong term, stable support schemeswhich allow a multiplicity of actors to invest in the sector will provide asecure basis for development of the industry in a decentralised way.Another prominent example is Germany, where the feed­in­tariff
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scheme has stimulated innovation and led to significant cost reductionsparticular in the solar PV technology. This can be supported byownership restrictions which direct investment opportunities to thecommunities closest to the installation themselves” (Mendonca, Lacey,& Hvelplund, 2009, p.294). In contrast, government policies can be animportant barrier to development in the cleantech industry: “theuncertainty and discontinuity of energy policies are the main causes ofsmall development of renewable energy [in the Netherlands andSweden]” (Marques & Fuinhas, 2011, p. 1603). Without a conducivepolicy environment, cleantech offers a much more limited outlook onachieving significant and lasting growth. Board members who tap intorelevant policy networks can clearly be an asset in this respect. Third, it has been increasingly recognised that effective inter­organizational networks do not only create local but also globalnetworks. Global connections can be thought of as pipelines that are“essential complements to the ‘local buzz’ that is produced andreproduced in agglomerated centres where innovative activity isconcentrated” (Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004; Gertler & Levitte,2005, p.489). For cleantech firms, global connections are especiallyrelevant as sources of access to and information about new markets.Companies can use the network of their board members to ensure whatcould be called ‘indirect’ market access. Board members with additionalfunctions in companies operating in other markets (whether or not thatcompany is part of the cleantech sector) de­facto offer valuable insightsabout new markets. International experience brought in through theboard of directors can thus be an important source of information – asfor example a board member’s Canadian business experience to a US­based start­up. However, at a time when international business isundergoing a massive shift from developed to emerging markets, thistype of market access is particularly relevant for getting a foot in thedoor in the growing, and less­consolidated, consumer markets of forexample Eastern Europe and Asia. In sum, we expect that the cleantech firms are particularly keen onengaging in board ties with organisations that can help to increaseaccess to the three resource bases: finance & innovation, access topolicy influence, and access to new markets. In addition, if theperspective of network capital is indeed apt, we would also expect that
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different cleantech firms will pursue different network strategies. Afterall, the network configuration should be – at least to a certain extent – areflection of the particularities of the corporation. We will thereforeinvestigate to what extent we can discern different network strategiesamong the cleantech firms, for example, between the larger and smallercorporations.
We used the cleantech company ranking as published by theauthoritative cleantech website www.cleantech.org as a basis for theselection of firms. The index is comprised of corporations that areconsidered global leaders in cleantech across a broad range of industrysectors, from alternative energy and energy efficiency to advancedmaterials, air & water purification, eco­friendly agriculture/nutrition,power transmission, and more. Firms are included in the list based ontheir perceived “staying power and the ability to exploit rapidly growingand evolving markets”. It does not list every company in the sector orcompanies recently re­branded as “green” but is an expert­picked list ofpromising cleantech firms. For the purpose of this paper we included all77 firms in the list (30 September 2010). The firms are distributed overfour categories: Energy Efficiency (46%), Renewable Energy (30%),Sustainable Management (17%) and Waste Management (7%).Although the 77 cleantech firms have home bases across the globe, theyare not distributed evenly. The majority of the organisations (60%) arebased in North America, followed by Europe (28%) and Asia (12%). Nofirms fromAfrica or South America are included in the list. For all 77 firms we identified the members of the boards of directorsusing annual reports, the Financial Times website and the Amadeusdatabase of Bureau van Dijk. Countries differ in the way corporategovernance is organised. In some countries the executive board and thesupervisory board are separate entities (two­tier system), in othercountries there is one board with board executives and non­executives(one­tier system). In all cases we included both executive and non­executive directors. However, we did not include the managerial cohortbelow the level of the board.
Data and Methods
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For each of the individual members we subsequently listed all otherorganisations they are affiliated with through directorships and boardmemberships. These additional memberships and affiliations were takenfrom the annual reports and of corporate websites. Cross­checkingmultiple sources per person often showed that information in thebiographies was not fully complete. The list of memberships andaffiliations for the same person might differ across various annualreports. We have been as inclusive as possible. Using the publiclyavailable records means that we are able to distil networks of thecleantech firms through those affiliations and board memberships thatare explicitly mentioned. Because outside directorships add to the statusof the cleantech directors and hence to that of the firm, we can expectthat functions and memberships with relevant organisations are allincluded. The final database includes 723 cleantech directors and 1662additional organisations with which the cleantech directors areaffiliated. The total number of organisations in the database is therefore1739. The dataset is available for further analysis at the first author’swebsite. We included each separate, unique board in the database. This allowsto capture market access through board networks but also allowsmapping the interpersonal meeting network and social capital of thecleantech directors. We used a relational database as the main repositoryfor the network information, which also allowed retrieving the basicdescriptives and statistics on firms and directors. In addition, thesoftware package UCINET was applied for calculating networkmeasures and the package NETDRAW for building the relatedsociograms (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). (Note that thenetwork we analyse here is a subset of a larger network of interlockingdirectorates. We did not include the links between firms that are createdby board members who are not a member of a cleantech corporation.Therefore we refrained from applying network­wide topologicalindicators such as average distance or eigenvector and betweenesscentrality). In order to map the resource bases, we placed all affiliations ofcleantech directors into one of seven categories. First there are the threeresource bases: finance, innovation and access to policy networks.Banks and venture capital firms are categorised under finance.
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For each of the individual members we subsequently listed all otherorganisations they are affiliated with through directorships and boardmemberships. These additional memberships and affiliations were takenfrom the annual reports and of corporate websites. Cross­checkingmultiple sources per person often showed that information in thebiographies was not fully complete. The list of memberships andaffiliations for the same person might differ across various annualreports. We have been as inclusive as possible. Using the publiclyavailable records means that we are able to distil networks of thecleantech firms through those affiliations and board memberships thatare explicitly mentioned. Because outside directorships add to the statusof the cleantech directors and hence to that of the firm, we can expectthat functions and memberships with relevant organisations are allincluded. The final database includes 723 cleantech directors and 1662additional organisations with which the cleantech directors areaffiliated. The total number of organisations in the database is therefore1739. The dataset is available for further analysis at the first author’swebsite. We included each separate, unique board in the database. This allowsto capture market access through board networks but also allowsmapping the interpersonal meeting network and social capital of thecleantech directors. We used a relational database as the main repositoryfor the network information, which also allowed retrieving the basicdescriptives and statistics on firms and directors. In addition, thesoftware package UCINET was applied for calculating networkmeasures and the package NETDRAW for building the relatedsociograms (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). (Note that thenetwork we analyse here is a subset of a larger network of interlockingdirectorates. We did not include the links between firms that are createdby board members who are not a member of a cleantech corporation.Therefore we refrained from applying network­wide topologicalindicators such as average distance or eigenvector and betweenesscentrality). In order to map the resource bases, we placed all affiliations ofcleantech directors into one of seven categories. First there are the threeresource bases: finance, innovation and access to policy networks.Banks and venture capital firms are categorised under finance.
Conducive policies include access to think tanks, lobby groups andinterest organisations. Innovation includes research institutes,universities, and corporations with a clear Research & Developmentorientation. In addition to the three resource bases we discern a numberof additional categories. The fourth category is the broad set oforganisations in Industry & Services. Basically, it represents thebusiness community except for high­tech, energy, and finance. It alsoincludes general ICT firms without a dominant R&D orientation,pharmaceuticals and health care. Although arguably innovation takesplace in these types of organisations, we do not regard this as importantfor the resource base from the perspective of the cleantech firms. Fifth,we distinguish a separate category, energy, because of its close links tothe cleantech industry. Finally, a small set of institutions such asmuseums and cultural institutions are part of the set ‘public’. For a smallnumber of organisations we were not able to determine their activities;they are listed as unknown. In order to map the board network access to markets, we haveassembled the relevant geographic office location data for those privatecompanies where cleantech executives serve on the board. Thegeographic distribution of office networks is widely used in relationaleconomic geography as an indicator for global economic developmentsacross different territorial scales (e.g. Godfrey & Zhou, 1999; Neal,2008; Taylor et al., 2011). Because non­executive directors are not partof the day­to­day management of the firm, it is useful to zoom in on thenetwork of the executive directors for this part of the analysis. Wescored each of the corporations linked to cleantech executives in termsof access to foreign markets. Having offices in another country meansthat specialist regional information, offices and other infrastructures arein place, and that staff members are familiar with domestic regulations,business culture and society. Through their board membership at suchfirms cleantech directors can tap into these resources. Therefore wemeasure a given firm’s level of market access by the number ofcountries in which it has an office location.
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We are not aware of a previous study that mapped the board network ofthe cleantech industry. Therefore it seems worthwhile to investigate thegeneral properties of the interconnections. Together the boards of the 77cleantech firms consist of 730 seats, an average of 9.5 directors percorporation. This is comparable to board sizes in the USA, whichincreased from 8.9 in 2001 to 9.3 in 2009 (Chu & Davis, 2011). Table 1gives some board and network descriptives. For three­quarters of themembers of the cleantech elite (545), we were able to identify additionalboard memberships and organisational affiliations. This group ofinterlocking directors can be denoted as the inner circle of the cleantechelite (Useem, 1984). Together the cleantech inner circle spans a networkof 6833 interlocks through their 1810 additional board memberships andaffiliations at 1662 distinct (non­cleantech) organisations. Interestingly,cleantech firms hardly interlock among themselves: there are only sevendirect interlocks that connect the boards of the 77 cleantechcorporations. In this, they differ from financial sectors, for instance,where direct board interlocks have been very common in a multitude ofcountries such as the USA (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003), the Netherlands(Heemskerk, 2007), Germany (Windolf, 2002) and many others (Kogut,2012; Stokman, Ziegler, & Scott, 1985). It is a well­known feature of complex networks, including networksof board interlocks, that the network ties are not evenly distributed overthe nodes of the network. Typically, a small group of nodes, be itdirectors or organisations, attract a large proportion of the network ties(Schweitzer et al., 2009; Watts, 1999). One implication of this is thataverage indicators of network centrality often disguise importantproperties of the network. Figure 1 therefore shows how the networkties are distributed over the directors and organisations in the sample.The pronounced leftward bias in Figure 1 indicates that the largemajority of organisations and directors make only a limited contributionto the overall network. For most organisations we see a peak in the
Empirical Results
The Board Network of the Cleantech Elite: Architecture and
Properties
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distribution at two to four network ties (interlocks). These firms aremoderately connected within the network. What follows is a rather steepdecline to about ten interlocks per firm. Here we see a steady groupemerging with ten to twenty board interlocks. A select group of firmsmake a disproportionate large contribution to the network with morethan 30 board interlocks. For the board members we see a somewhatsimilar distribution. A fair share of the cleantech directors only have oneboard position and are not part of the inner circle. The directors with atleast two positions create board interlocks. With still a fair share ofdirectors with three interlocks, there is a rather steep decline from fourinterlocks onwards that is followed by a long tail of directors who eachcontribute considerably to the network because they occupy many boardpositions.  
Nr of Cleantech Firms 77
All Board Position 730
executive positions 206
non executive positions 524
Average board size 9,5
executive 2,7
non executive 6,8
Number of additional board positions 1810
Number of connected non cleantech organisations 1662
Number of cleantech directors 723
Board network ties (lines) 6833
Average number of network ties per director 9,5
Average number of network ties per organisation 7,9
Number of cleantech directors with additional
board positions (inner circle)
executive 105
545
Table 1
Board positions and network ties ofcleantech firms
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 The structure of the network reflects the way in which the datacollection was organised. First we collected 77 separate (ego) networksof the cleantech firms. These separated components can becomeconnected when two cleantech directors meet each other at anotherorganisation. We call this an indirect interlock. Of all cleantech firms,39 are connected with each other through indirect board interlocks. Thenetwork divides into a number of components: nine pairs and one largecomponent where 21 cleantech firms are connected. The dominantcomponent of the cleantech network extends to a much larger network,connecting a total of 527 firms (see Figure 2). The board networks ofthe cleantech firms are further illustrated in Figure 3. It shows one pair(not part of the dominant component) between French Schnyder Electricand Ansys from the USA. The two firms are connected through fourindirect interlocks. In addition, they are both entrenched in boardnetworks with a wide range of organisations, which we will analyzebelow. The cleantech firms are well embedded in larger organizationalnetwork structures. But among themselves, the cleantech corporations
Figure 1. Distribution of positions and interlocks over directors andorganisations
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remain sparsely interconnected. This suggests an external networkorientation. The next section therefore investigates how the networkmakes use of these external linkages: Do they allow firms to tap intovaluable resources that can support their business activity?
Table 2 below shows the resource base of the network of the 723cleantech directors. The first column lists how many of theorganisations in the cleantech network belong to each of the sevencategories. Clearly, the cleantech firms are well embedded in the largerbusiness community. As a group, the cleantech directors connect to allsix categories. The second column shows which part of the cleantechdirectors’ network connects to each category. How many of the 77cleantech firms connect with each resource base is shown in the thirdcolumn. Of all 1662 organisations in the cleantech network, 42.8percent fall in the broad ‘Industry & Services’ category. ‘Finance’ rankssecond with 16.8 percent of all firms, followed by ‘Innovation’ with15.6. Just under eleven percent of the organisations in the cleantechnetwork are within the ‘Policy’ category; 6.8 within ‘Energy’ and 4.6 arefound within ‘Public’. If we look at the number of interlocks thecleantech firms create with each of the categories, we see that thisclosely resembles the overall Distribution (see column 2 in Table 2.Innovation and Energy receive a slightly more board interlocks, theother categories a little less). A first glance at these figures reveals that the cleantech firms have anextensive network through their board members. Next to ties with thebusiness community, the operational resources (finance and innovation)are best catered for, with over sixteen percent of all ties (column 2).More than 90 percent of all cleantech firms have a direct board tie witha financial institution, and 83 percent connect with innovativeorganisations. This confirms our expectation that the financial resourcebase remains most important for cleantech firms. However, innovationis almost as important for cleantech as finance. Access to policyinfluencing bodies, on the other hand, seems a less important part of theboard network. With just over ten per cent of all ties, it remains sparsely
Network Access to Operational Resources and Conducive Policies
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connected to this group of organisations, although still over 63 percentof all cleantech firms include policy influencing bodies in their boardnetwork. Energy is only marginally connected. Finally, publicorganisations hardly play a role in the network. While in some sectionsof the corporate elite the relatively informal setting of charity and othercivil society oriented organisations present themselves as excellentvenues for networking (Heemskerk, 2007), cleantech directors hardlytake part in this. As officers of the firms, executive directors typically have muchfewer additional positions because of time constraints. When they dochoose to invest time and energy into additional positions they do sowith consent from the rest of their board and typically chooseorganisations that can be beneficial to their primary affiliation. Non­executive, or outside directors on the other hand are typically recruitedon the basis of their (network) profile and often include officers fromother firms. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 show the subset of the networkthat is created by the 206 cleantech executives only, columns 6 and 7 thesubset of the 524 non­executives. As the table shows, executives andnon­executives have a markedly different network. First, and perhapsmost pronounced, the interlocks with finance are clearly dividedbetween the two groups of directors. Only 5.8 percent of the network ofcleantech executives connects with finance, while for non­executives,finance constitutes over nineteen percent of their network. Thedominance of non­executives in the financial part of the networksuggests that these ties serve as a monitoring device: financialinstitutions link with cleantech firms through non­executive directoratesin order to have direct access to information and strategic decision­making. This kind of monitoring tie can be seen as the reverseindication of a resource dependency and have been very common inearly networks of interlocking directorates (Fennema, 1982; Stokman,Ziegler, & Scott, 1985). A second observation is that, next to the overall group of Industry &Services, executives invest most in ties with lobby work and the energysector, while these categories are only moderately covered by the entireboard network. With both comprising just under twenty percent of theirties, it is clear that cleantech executives care for good network ties withenergy businesses, as well as with ties to policy influencing bodies such
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as lobby organisations, industry associations or political advisorybodies. Non­executives, on the contrary, only devote a modest part oftheir network to these two categories. In fact, all of the connectionscleantech firms have with organisations in the energy domain arecreated by a cleantech executive and are only sometimes strengthenedby additional interlocks of non­executives (as shown by the 53.2 percentreach of the executives). Finally, innovation remains an important partof the network for both executives (16.9%) and non­executives (15.9%).Being present at other innovative organisations is clearly an asset forcleantech directors, which confirms the expected link betweenoperational resources and network access.
 In line with our expectations, the cleantech directors maintain anextensive network with other organisations in the domains of financeand innovation. These ties can help the cleantech firms to reduce theirresource dependencies. These findings suggest that non­executivedirectors have a more externally oriented role, bridging with resources
Table 2
Resource base ofCTfirms through board interlocks
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such as finance. Cleantech executives on the other hand have, as officersand representatives of the firm, a network that is geared towards thenearby sectors of energy and reflect their responsibility for a successfullobby strategy.
A cleantech firm sells a particular range of products and needsfavourable conditions that allow for potential growth in terms ofproduction, export and domestic sales. However, not every country hasan interesting market in which it is worth investing (be it time orcapital). We therefore use four indicator categories to determine whetheror not a country offers a market for cleantech. First, companies arelooking for relevant, conducive (macro­)policies. A country’s nationalcommitment to reduce CO2 emissions for example stands for aconsistent climate policy, which in turn makes corporate investments incleantech more promising. Second, the level of CO2 emissions (bothabsolute and in relative terms) indicate how much can actually be savedwhen introducing cleantech solutions and products (which isindependent from the political commitment to CO2 reduction). Third,we can look at a country’s overall levels of energy consumption in orderto determine the need for cleantech products. For assessing futurepotential, the current and projected growth figures of energy demand areof particular interest. A possible fourth indicator is directly related to thecleantech sector’s current performance. When looking at the actualcleantech product sales per country, it is possible to determine whetheror not a cleantech firm could expect to do good business in a givenmarket. Table 3 provides an overview of these four indicator categories,and the six related quantitative indicators used for the analysis. In total,the four categories led to a list of 52 countries, whereby each countryhad to be included as a top scorer in at least one of the lists. Forexample, Latvia has a political commitment to reduce its CO2 emissionsby eight per cent, and does not feature in any of the other rankings.Indonesia in contrast has no political commitment under the KyotoProtocol, but has a relatively high score on energy consumption growth(six per cent) in 2009­2010 within the G20.
Market Access Through Executive Networks
71International andMultidisciplinary Journal ofSocial Sciences 2(1)
 All four categories can be linked to the level of market access that isoffered to cleantech firms through their board networks. When cleantechexecutives sit on the board of other corporations they have access toinformation and the infrastructure about those countries in which thecompany is present. The 206 cleantech executives hold board positionsat 167 distinct corporations (non­corporate organisations such asfoundations, research institutes and the like are not included for this partof the analysis). The 52 national markets represent nearly 80 per cent ofall office locations counted in the 167­company sample. Hence, thecleantech firms’ linkages to international markets generally matchtoday’s most interesting cleantech markets.
 Of these 167 companies in the cleantech network 40 per cent provideaccess to international markets; the remaining 60 per cent have adistinctively domestic outlook. This confirms Gertler and Levitte’sargument that local inter­organizational networks remain important in
Category Quantitative indicator Year Source Total countriescovered bydata
1 PoliticalCommitment Commited CO2 reductionsby 2020 as ratifyedthrough Kyoto Protocol
2011 United NationsFramework Conventionon Climate Change
26 (­8% to +8%commited CO2reduction)
2 National CO2emissions Total CO2 emissions 2008 Energy InformationAgency 20 (ranking)
Weighted CO2 emissions(annual CO2 emissionsper capita and cumulativefigure 1900­2006)
2011 Maplecroft 20 (ranking)
3 EnergyDemand Growth in energyconsumption 2009­2010 2011 Enerdata
14 (represen­ting 90% ofG20 consump­tion4 IndustryVolume Total clean energytechnology product sales 2008 Roland BergerStrategy Consultants 20 (ranking)
Relative clean energytechnology 2008 Roland BergerStrategy Consultants
20 (ranking)
Table 3
Four selected categories to define relevant markets for the cleantech industry1
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innovative industries (Gertler & Levitte, 2005), despite the fact thatmany cleantech firms have international access through their boardnetwork offers cleantech firms access to 111 countries (through a totalof 1532 country presences). Out of the set of 77 cleantech firms, 30have access to up to ten other national markets. As we are interested inthe market access by the cleantech sector in general, we are not usingcompany specific, but sector specific figures. For example, thecleantech network creates indirect access to the German market through45 country presences (there are 45 distinct companies in the cleantechnetwork that have at least one office location in Germany). Thisrepresents four per cent of the 1120 office locations included in thesample. Using this method we can determine for each of the fourindicators whether or not on an aggregate level, the cleantech firms haveaccess to the most relevant markets. In terms of political commitment, we chose to limit the assessment tothose 26 countries with an eight per cent CO2 reduction target (all EU­27 countries except for Poland, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta, plusSwitzerland, Monaco and Liechtenstein). This way, it is possible tocompare the relative number of office locations with those countries thatshare the highest commitment to CO2 reductions. The 27 countriesreceive in total 46.5% of all country presences. The results as displayedin Figure 4 show that the largest countries score relatively high, such asGermany, the United Kingdom (four per cent of the total officelocations), as well as Spain and France (more than three per cent). Somesmaller countries score relatively high (more than two per cent),including Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland. Some othersmall markets on the other hand score relatively low, such as Latvia,Luxembourg and Lithuania. This suggests that current cleantechnetworks provide indirect market access to those countries where thereis a combination of political commitments to high CO2 reductions andsizable markets. When relating CO2 emissions to office locations, the cleantechnetwork offers varied levels of access to countries with high CO2emissions (see Figure 5). On the one hand, the United States has thehighest score in terms of office locations in the network, and presents aninteresting market because of its high CO2 ranking. This is also true forChina, where there is a coupling of high CO2 emission and a high score
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for office locations. Access to the Spanish and French markets is alsorelatively good for their respective section of the ranking. India andJapan in contrast have much lower office counts yet have some of thehighest ranking in terms of emissions. Also, market access to Iran, SaudiArabia and Ukraine is very low in relative terms.
Figure 4. Board access to markets with 8% CO2 reduction target
Source: UNFCC, 2011
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 Third, energy consumption growth in the period 2009/2010 alsoshows a picture of weak association (see Figure 6). While market accessto major developed economies such as Germany, France and the UnitedStates is well established, the cleantech network does not offersignificant access to those markets that have major energy consumptiongrowth, such as Brazil and the Russian Federation (ten and eleven percent respectively). Interestingly, market access to three of the fourcountries that had positive growth levels throughout the financial crisis(Indonesia, India and South Korea) also remains limited (1.2 and 3.0and 2.4 per cent respectively). Lastly, there is the cleantech industry itself (see Figure 7). Theabsolute numbers reveal a clear correlation between office locations andthe top 20 countries in terms of product sales per country. Exceptions tothis correlation include Germany (1st), Japan (3rd), Denmark (5th) andBrazil (6th). Despite their impressive cleantech sales figures, marketaccess by cleantech companies for those four countries stay below theaverage. In contrast, market access to the United Kingdom (9th) andItaly (17th) score high above average in our sample. The data suggest that the cleantech network offers access to thosemain international markets that are generally considered important toglobal business. The relation between global office distribution acrossthe network and absolute product sales figures remains the most visiblelink between cleantech markets and what cleantech firms can expectfrom board membership in terms of reducing market accessdependencies. When looking in more detail at where low­carbontechnologies could make a difference, the data does not support a strongcorrelation, be it with policy commitment, CO2 emissions or increasingenergy demand. This indicates that the cleantech sector resourcedependencies that can be reduced through elite networks are more orless limited to major current markets (where cleantech already generatesrevenue), but does not cater for potentially more interesting newmarkets (where future revenue growth in the cleantech industry can beexpected).
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Figure 5. CO2 emissions versus market access offered by the cleantech elitenetwork
Figure 6. Energy consumption growth versus market access offered by thecleantech elite network
Source: Energy Information Agency (2008)
Source: Enerdata (2011)
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Given the heterogeneity in size, scope and business, it can be expectedthat the cleantech sector is composed of sets of corporations withdifferent network strategies. In order to get a sense of how the variablesare related we calculated how the resource bases embedded in the boardnetwork relate to the size of the firm, measured by market capitalization.This helps us to see if large firms have a different network strategy fromsmall firms. A correlation analysis shows some interesting results aboutthe relationship between the resource bases. Figure 8 illustrates therelations of significant correlation (at least 0.05). First of all, there arestrong and highly significant relationships between size, market accessand business community. The larger the firm, the more the cleantechexecutives have access to alternative markets through their boardnetworks. This is in line with the findings that market access is mostlycreated through networks with the larger business community, and inparticular with executive interlocks with large multinational
Figure 7. Cleantech industry volume versus market access offered by thecleantech elite network
Source: Roland Berger (2009).
Cleantech’s Network Strategies
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organisations. As such, market access seems more a corollary of tieswith the business community than a result of a network strategy orientedtowards reducing resource dependencies. Size also correlates stronglywith Finance (.418). This indicates that the larger cleantech firms in oursample predominantly create network ties with finance. Above wealready found that non­executives, rather than executives at thecleantech firms create the ties with finance. Also, we expected thatcleantech firms would create board interlocks with the financial sectorin order to secure resources, and that this would be less the case forlarger companies with a consolidated business portfolio. As it turns out,this is not the case; it is the larger firms that relate to finance.Furthermore, the network strategies of the cleantech executives asdiscussed above translate into a significant correlation of Finance withthe category Conducive Policies. And firms who are oriented towardsthe energy sector also invest in ties with organisations that can provideconducive policies. Both of these resource bases do not correlate withsize. In addition, firms that invest in conducive policies are also thefirms with a network investment in innovation (.484). This indicates thatsmaller firms’ network strategies are not based on isolated sectors.Instead they merge to form ‘clusters’ such as finance/conducive policiesor energy/conducive policies. Put differently, cleantech firms apply anetwork strategy which allows them to using their board to reduce a setof selected resource dependencies: larger firms focus on market access,finance and business networks, while smaller ones seem to targetresource ‘clusters’. The correlation analysis suggests that firms differ in their networkstrategy depending on size. Therefore we split the set of firms in two bythe median market capitalization and did a similar correlation analysison both sets. The set of the 38 largest firms show by and large similarcorrelations throughout the entire set. Some relationships lose theirsignificance, such as those between Market Access and Innovation, andConducive Policies with Finance and with Innovation. Among the 39small firms however, the correlations between the two resource basesConducive Polices and Innovation appear as a dominant feature.Apparently, it is the cleantech firms with a smaller market capitalisationthat combine network ties with conducive policies and innovation. Wecould therefore consider these smaller cleantech firms being less
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consolidated and geared towards stimulating growth in the overallcleantech industry. It is not finance that they need; it is on­goinginnovation and conducive policies which can ensure new products and agrowing market size. Comparing the means of the larger and the smallercleantech firms further corroborates these findings. The larger cleantechfirms have significantly more network ties with Industry and Service(t=2.331) and with Finance (t=2.229).
As a relatively new addition to the international business community,cleantech is a fast­moving part of the global economy, with significantprospects for sustained growth over the next decades. In this paper weinvestigated to what extent the network of board members is a strategicasset for the reduction of key dependencies for this growing sector. Weformulated three theoretical perspectives on how the board networkcould benefit the cleantech firms: through its access to operationalresources (finance and innovation), policy networks and foreign
Figure 8. Correlations between resource bases and company size
Conclusion and Discussion
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markets. Our findings confirm that board networks in the cleantechbusiness indeed reflect the strategic needs to reduce externaldependencies. This holds particularly true for reducing dependencies onfinancial resources. Network linkages to finance are a dominant part of today’s cleantechboard networks, even though larger firms tap much more into the boardsof financial institutions than smaller ones. Closer scrutiny howeverrevealed that the board ties that cleantech firms have with financialinstitutions are part of the existing linkages with the businesscommunity in general. Especially the larger firms have directors on theirboard with an extensive network in the business community coveringfinance, as well as industry & services. Cleantech firms are also well connected to the boards of innovativefirms. Both executives and non­executives build these ties, underscoringthe importance of innovation for the cleantech industry. Especially thesmaller Cleantech firms seem to focus on network ties with innovationrather than finance, in combination with network ties to policynetworks. In terms of policy networks, board interlocks serve to uphold the tiesof business communities and relevant decision­making circles. Overallwe did not find a strong network presence of cleantech board ofdirectors in policy networks. Closer inspection however revealed thatexecutive directors, quite contrary to the non­executive directors, have amore pronounced orientation towards policy planning forums. In asimilar vein, executives steer their network towards the energy sector,which is in sharp contrast with the non­executive directors. In thecleantech board network, executives and non­executives have differentnetwork strategies, which cater for distinctive needs. This suggests thatsimilar studies on board networks would benefit from paying moreattention to the differences in network orientation between differenttypes of directors. Executives can be seen as the officers whose task it isto insource crucial resources. Non­executives tie the cleantech firmsinto the wider corporate and financial business community. Aninteresting thought here is that the cleantech directors might also act ascarriers of a sustainable economy underlying the cleantech industry tothe wider business community. The extent to which they are ‘agents’ ofchange, in terms of sustainability in the business community, warrants
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separate research though. Looking at market access, the results showed how the cleantechexecutive network offers access to many of the most importantinternational markets. This is particularly the case for large companies.It is noteworthy that the network offers limited access to those marketsthat could be considered interesting potential markets for cleantechproducts. Political commitment to CO2 emission reduction, CO2emission levels and energy growth figures in countries do not correlatewith the linkages board networks offer today. Some future opportunityto enter a promising market might have to be done through otherbusiness connections/networks. In contrast, today’s largest cleantechmarkets do correlate with the highest access resources throughout thenetwork. From a theoretical perspective the combination of socialnetwork analysis and economic geography tools proved useful ininvestigating the relationship between board networks and potentialmarket access. In particular when looking at the current debates in thefield of global production networks, this approach promises interestinginsights into the role of firm actors as key drivers behind a globalisingeconomy. At the same time, refinement is needed in order to developmore detailed indicators for measuring market access through elitenetworks. Our analysis underscores the RDT argument that there is more tocorporate governance than monitoring and controlling management.Corporations are not unrelated atoms that operate on anonymousmarkets, but are intrinsically embedded in a number of inter­organizational networks. At the apex of corporate power, cleantechfirms have ample access to crucial resources. Our findings also supportthe view that networks of corporate directors are not merely passiveconduits for the spread of information or building blocks of socialcapital: they are indeed network capital with direct strategic value to thefirm and its board members, and that this approach promises interestinginsights when it comes to emerging business sectors such as thecleantech industry. With this explorative study we have shown that scholars in socialnetwork analysis would benefit from broadening their analyticaltoolbox. In order to develop the research agenda in this direction, nextsteps could centre on three issues.
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 First, the scope should be broadened. Corporate directors typicallyhave a much larger network, including previous appointments. Theseprevious board positions and affiliations can provide for access toresources in a similar way as we analyzed the current positions andthese previous career paths act as important building blocks of thecorporate elite network. Many of the corporate directors may have beencolleagues on boards before, adding to the cohesion of the cleantechelite. For this paper, we studied the network from a resource dependencyperspective, disregarding many of the important questions that can beasked from a social (elite) cohesion perspective. A second issue to test ishow consequential and beneficial these network ties are for thecleantech firms. Are firms with strong board networks in finance indeedmore successful in securing loans and investment, do ties withinnovative organisations spur innovation in the focal firm, and does awell­balanced director network add to the overall survival changes andsuccess of the cleantech corporations? As we deal with an emergingsector, some of these questions can only be answered in a few years’time. A third opportunity is to expand this line of research by lookingbeyond the cleantech companies themselves and focus instead oncleantech directors as ambassadors of sustainable investments andbusiness practice. For instance, one might expect that organisations thathave cleantech directors on their board, in particular cleantechexecutives, would be relatively active in reducing their carbon footprintand in general more sympathetic towards sustainability, corporate socialresponsibility and renewable energy. From this perspective the boardnetwork of the cleantech directors is not only a device to secureresources, but also a social structure that helps to build and disseminatethe very ideas and practices on which the sector builds. Scholars in thefield of social network analysis, corporate governance and economicgeography are invited to contribute to the further development of such aresearch agenda.
1 Due to lack of full data for all countries, we chose to use the rankings in order to‘score’ each indicator. This makes comparison less technical, as it only refers tocountries as scoring 1st, 2nd etc. This makes reading easy and suffices for the purpose at
Notes
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hand: testing the concept of using geographical data for measuring market access from aresource dependency perspective. However, follow­up research could make an attemptto gather primary data for all relevant countries in order to provide a more exactassessment.
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